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Abstract—To avoid the single point of failure for the certificate
authority (CA) in MANET, a decentralized solution is proposed
where nodes are grouped into different clusters. Each cluster
should contain at least two confident nodes. One is known as
CA and the another as register authority RA. The Dynamic
Demilitarized Zone (DDMZ) is proposed as a solution for
protecting the CA node against potential attacks. It is formed
from one or more RA node. The problems of such a model are:
(1) Clusters with one confident node, CA, cannot be created
and thus clusters’ sizes are increased which negatively affect
clusters’ services and stability. (2) Clusters with high density
of RA can cause channel collision at the CA. (3) Clusters’
lifetime are reduced since RA monitors are always launched (i.e.,
resource consumption). In this paper, we propose a model based
on mechanism design that will allow clusters with single trusted
node (CA) to be created. Our mechanism will motivate nodes
that do not belong to the confident community to participate by
giving them incentives in the form of trust, which can be used for
cluster’s services. To achieve this goal, a RA selection algorithm
is proposed that selects nodes based on a predefined selection
criteria function and location (i.e., using directional antenna).
Finally, empirical results are provided to support our solutions.
Index Terms—MANET security, mechanism design, certificate
authority and clustering.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wired/wireless infrastructure networks, a trusted third
party, known as Certification Authority (CA), is needed to
certify users’ digital certificate that contains users’ public key
and identity. It is needed to provide a secure communication
among users and ensure some security requirements, such as;
authentication, confidentiality and integrity of transited data.
In classical Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [8], a Registra-
tion Authority (RA) is used to collect and analyze users’
requests before forwarding them to a CA to certify, issue and
renew user’s digital certificate. In Mobile Ad hoc Networks
(MANETs), a decentralized certificate authority approach [5],
[9], [19] is proposed, due to MANET characteristics, as a
solution to avoid single point of failure, MANET attacks and
consider nodes’ mobility. To handle these requirements, a
distributed clustering algorithm is proposed in [18] to cluster
nodes based on a set of trusted nodes that belong to a confident
community. A head cluster is selected among trusted nodes to
play the role of CA. To overcome a single point of failure
attack against CA, a set of one-hop nodes, RA, are selected
from the set of trusted nodes to form a Dynamic Demilitarized
Zone (DDMZ). The role of these nodes, besides registration
authority, is to protect the CA by filtering CA’s incoming
requests and monitoring the behavior of nodes in the cluster.
The approach is suitable once the confident community size
is large enough to grant at least two trusted nodes per cluster
(i.e., one CA and another RA).
The first limitation of the approach given in [18] is its
inability to form clusters with single trusted node (CA) and
to form the DDMZ from non-confident community. This will
decrease the number of clusters and increase clusters’ size
which affect clusters’ services and MANET stability. The
second limitation is clusters’ lifetime since all selected RA
nodes are required to run their monitor and consume resources.
Moreover, a high density DDMZ can increase the probability
of channel collision at CA. Finally, DDMZ formation is a
limitation since RA nodes are selected ignoring CA coverage
area. This violates the role of DDMZ since it allows an
adversary to launch attacks against CA from RA’s uncovered
zones.
To overcome these limitations, a robust DDMZ must
be built based on nodes from non-confident community. To
build a robust model that can cover the CA coverage area,
nodes must be cooperative and selected by the CA based on
specific selection criteria where some of the parameters of the
selection-criteria are considered as private information. The
limitation of such a proposition is that nodes might behave
selfishly in order not to be selected as RA and consume
resources. This will be done by revealing a fake selection-
criteria information. To solve such a problem, incentives must
be given to nodes to motivate them to participate and serve
as RA. The problem that arises here is: How to design the
incentives to motivate nodes to participate and reveal truthful
information to build a robust DDMZ?
In this paper, we design a unified model that is able to:
• Motivate nodes from non-confident community to serve
as RA and build a robust DDMZ.
• Prevent nodes from revealing fake information by de-
signing incentives based on Vickrey, Clarke and Groves
(VCG) mechanism where truth telling is the dominant
strategy among all nodes.
• Increase the CA protection through the design of robust
DDMZ formation condition that can select RA nodes
based on their location.
• Increase the clusters’ lifetime by selecting the RA nodes
based on a specific selection-criteria function.
• Increase the number of clusters and reduce the cluster’s
size. This will help to efficiently serve the nodes of the
cluster and effect network stability. Moreover, it increases
the probability of detecting the misbehaving nodes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we discuss the related work on certification authority in
MANET and application of mechanism design to networks.
In Section III, we provide the problem statement. In Section
IV, MANET clustering and CA selection algorithm is given.
The robust DDMZ model is given in Section V where the
RA election model, selection criteria function, mechanism
model and RA election algorithm are illustrated followed by
an example. Section VI presents empirical results. Finally,
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
This section reviews related work on the distribution of the
certificate authority in MANET. Moreover, mechanism design
and its application to networks is given.
A. Certification Authority in MANET
In [4], the authors proposed a system based on the dis-
tribution of the certification authority among specific nodes
by using the threshold cryptography scheme [20] with several
threshold levels to offer nodes flexibility in selecting an appro-
priate security level for a given application. With this approach
the fault tolerant and hierarchical key management services
are ensured. Unfortunately, the approaches based on threshold
cryptography have some drawbacks: Firstly, the n nodes must
be initialized by a trusted authority which is responsible for
introducing the partial secret of CA role. On the other hand,
an external administration is necessary to configure the system
and establish the architecture. Secondly, the number k must
be a trade-off between availability and robustness, it must be
frequently updated. Thirdly, the system overloads the network
since the node must send at least k requests instead of sending
only one request to obtain a certificate or revocation (i.e., k−1
messages are needed).
A few works tried to introduce the fully CA distribu-
tion without using the threshold cryptography. We quote the
Hubaux et al.’s [5] approach and Satizabal et al.’s [19] system.
In these systems, each user is able to generate a certificate
for other users. Certificates are stored and distributed by the
users themselves. In this system, each user maintains a local
certificate repository. When two users want to check the public
keys of each other, they merge their local certificate reposi-
tories to find appropriate certificate chains. The drawback of
this approach is the assumption that trust is transitive and the
system becomes more vulnerable to malicious nodes.
Several works introduce the cluster concept for security in
MANETs particularly for the CA distribution. Dong et al. [9]
and Bechler et al. [3] propose the distribution of the CA
service by using threshold cryptography and introduce the
cluster structure. The cluster concept is adopted to provide
the CA service and proactive secret shared update protocol.
In Bechler et al.’s [3] approach, the certification of any
guest node must possess a certain number (W ) of warranty
certificates from warrantor nodes. Then, it must request at
least (k) certificates from different cluster heads (CHs), whose
association gives the network certificate. Unfortunately, this
approach is not realistic because the warrantor nodes do not
have any information about the new node to be guaranteed.
To overcome this problem, the authors of [18] proposed a
distributed architecture which divides the network into clusters
and distributes the CA in each cluster to secure the network.
They defined a new trust model and new concept of Dynamic
Demilitarized Zone (DDMZ) to secure the CA node in each
cluster against a single point failure and to monitor the nodes
in the cluster.
B. Mechanism Design Application
Mechanism design is a sub-field of microeconomics and
game theory [13]. It uses game theory tools to achieve a
desired goal. The main difference between game theory and
mechanism design is that the former is used to study what
could happen when independent players act selfishly, whereas
mechanism design allows us to define the game in such a way
that the outcome of the game, known as the Social Choice
Function (SCF), will be played by independent players accord-
ing to the rules set by the mechanism designer. Mechanism
design has been used in computer science by Nisan and Ronen
[16] for solving least cost path and task scheduling problems
using algorithmic mechanism design. Distributed mechanism
design based on VCG is first introduced in [10] to compute
the lowest cost routes for all source-destination pairs and
payments for transit nodes on all the routes. It is a direct
extension of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which causes
modest increases in routing table size and convergence time.
Currently in MANET, mechanism design is mainly used
for routing purposes. In [1], the authors present a truthful
adhoc-VCG mechanism to find the most cost-efficient route
in the presence of selfish nodes. In [7], the authors provide
an incentive compatible auction scheme to enable packet
forwarding service in MANET using VCG. A continuous
auction process runs to determine who should obtain how
much of the bandwidth and at what price. Incentives are in
the form of monetary rewards. On the other hand, mechanism
design is recently used for intrusion detection in MANET [17].
The authors propose a distributed election mechanism that
selects the most cost efficient node to play the role of leader
IDS in a cluster. To motivate nodes to behave normally during
the election process, the authors design incentives, based on
VCG, in the form of reputation where intrusion detection
service is offered to nodes according to their reputation. To
catch misbehaving leader after election, a catch an punish
model is proposed. As an extension for their work, the authors
proposed in [15] a distributed leader-IDS election mechanism
that can elect the most cost efficient leaders without running
any clustering algorithm.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
To protect the CA node, a set of trusted (Tm = 1) nodes
(one-hop) are selected to play the role of RA and form the
Dynamic Demilitarized Zone (DDMZ) [18]. This is done by
filtering the traffic of CA searching for attacks. Moreover, the
role of these nodes is to monitor the behavior of other nodes
in the cluster. The problems facing this model are: First, the
cluster formation requires at least two trusted nodes which
prevents clusters with one trusted node to be created. This will
lead nodes to join other clusters which increases the number
of nodes in the cluster and negatively affect the cluster’s
services (i.e., routing, intrusion detection, key distribution and
certification). Second, all trusted nodes are required to monitor
and play the role of RA to ensure security robustness which
causes nodes to consume a lot of resources and decrease the
cluster’s lifetime. Additionally, the more is the RA, the more
is the probability of channel collision at CA. Third, it is not
granted that the CA coverage area is always monitored by the
RA nodes. This is because the DDMZ formation condition
did not consider the CA coverage area which can be violated
by an attacker.
Solving these problems will start by proposing a solution
for cluster formation condition where clusters can be created
using one trusted node which is selected as CA. This propo-
sition faces the following challenges: First, nodes that will
be selected to play the role of RA, to form DDMZ, are
no more belonging to the confident community which can
lead nodes to behave selfishly. We define selfish node as an
economically rational node whose objective is to maximize
its benefits (payoffs). Second, RA selection will be based on
specific criteria such as energy level, trust level, mobility and
connectivity degree. Some of these information are considered
as private where nodes can reveal fake information in order not
to be selected and preserve their resources. Incentives must be
given in the form of trust in order to motivate nodes to reveal
their private information. The question arises here is: How to
design the incentive in such a way where truth telling is the
dominant strategy for all nodes? Third, to increase the cluster’s
lifetime and to avoid channel collision, a specific number of
nodes must be selected to form the DDMZ. Moreover, these
nodes should be able to monitor the CA coverage area by
filtering all the CA traffic. The question that we address is:
What is the minimum number of RA nodes needed to achieve
this goal?
Here, we propose a new DDMZ formation condition where
RA nodes will be selected by the CA based on their selection-
criteria function which is defined in terms of nodes’ private
information. Here, we assume that the CA is equipped with an
antenna that can work as directional or omni-directional. RA
election algorithm is designed where the directional antenna is
used to create the DDMZ by selecting a set of RA nodes that
meet the selection criteria. This will increase the robustness
of DDMZ. On the other hand, omni-directional antenna is
used to overhear the RA nodes and monitor their behavior.
Moreover, we propose a model based on VCG mechanism [12]
to motivate nodes to reveal truthfully their private information.
Payments are issued in the form of trust to motivate nodes
to say the truth. These propositions will help to increase the
cluster’s lifetime and reduce channel collision at the CA.
IV. MANET CLUSTERING AND CA ELECTION
ALGORITHM
In this section, we devise a clustering algorithm that clusters
MANET and elects a CA in each cluster. To ensure the
security, it is assumed that set of the nodes belong to a
confident community. For clusters with more than one trusted
node, the CA is selected among these nodes based on node’s
stability which increases cluster’s lifetime. Furthermore, the
clustering algorithm ensures the authentication and integrity
of the transited data during the election process.
Each trusted node sends two successive hello message in
order to calculate the Relative Mobility (RM ), after that,
it announces itself as CA with a certain cluster’s size (k-
hop). When a trusted node receives a beacon, from one of
its neighbors, it executes clustering algorithm 1 to change
its status from cluster-head (CA) to cluster-member. The
decision to change the status from CA to cluster-member
depends on two main parameters: Security and stability. A
CA is considered as more stable than others if it has a
low relative mobility. Any trusted node with relative mobility
more than a specific threshold is considered as unstable
and thus will not be considered during the CA selection.
The nodes situated between two adjacent clusters can be-
come gateway (GW) [18]. The following algorithm is ex-
ecuted by each node that belongs to confident community.
Algorithm 1: Clustering Algorithm (SDCAV 2)
When node j receives an election packet from node i;
begin
Packet-Authentication-Integrity-checking();
if (HopCount >= k) then No−Competition;
Goto(end);
else if (RMi < RMj) OR ((RMi == RMj) AND
(DNj < DNi)) then
Accept node i as CA;
else if (RMj < RMi) OR (DNj > DNi) then
node j remains as CA candidate;
else if (RMi == RMj) AND (DNj == DNi) then
apply Lowest-ID;
end
where, Packet−Authentication− Integrity− checking()
is the function which consists to check the integrity and the
authentication of the election packet. HopCount indicates the
hop number of the election packet.RMi is the relative mobility
of node i and DNi is the degree of the neighbors nodes of
the node i.
Once the CA node is elected per cluster, it starts to transmit
cluster’s beacon in order to inform the cluster’s member nodes
about its availability. The cluster’s nodes that are not receiving
any beacon from a CA for a predefined period of time is
considered as unavailable.
V. A ROBUST DDMZ MODEL
In this section, we present our RA election mechanism for
truthfully electing the RA nodes that will serve as DDMZ
and belong to non-confident community. In Subsection V-A,
we describe the RA election model followed by the selection
criteria function F for electing RA nodes is given in Subsec-
tion V-B. Subsection V-C formulates our mechanism model
using with the payment function followed by an example.
A. RA Election Model
Once the CA node of each cluster is selected, it elects a set
of RA nodes that belongs to non-confident community with a
certain trust-level. The RA nodes are located at one-hop from
the CA node. The role of RA nodes is to protect CA node
against attack from unknown nodes such as Denial of Service
(DoS). Any packet destined to CA node must be analyzed and
filtered by RA nodes. To achieve this goal, a robust DDMZ
should be created by selecting the best RA nodes based
on nodes’ selection criteria function and according to nodes
location. This will increase the performance of DDMZ since
the CA coverage area is protected by RA nodes. Selecting RA
nodes according to their location requires a secure localization
algorithm [6]. To avoid running such algorithm, directional
antenna is used by the CA where the CA’s zone is divided into
6 sectors [11]. The sectors are numbered from 1 to 6 starting
with zone 1 heading east as shown in figure 1. Dividing the
CA zone to 6 sectors with 250 m omni transmission range
leads to 450 m of directional transmission range [11]. With
such type of antenna, the CA node can allocate the location of
one-hop nodes. This proposition allows us to prolong cluster’s
lifetime by electing the minimum number of RA nodes that
covers the 6 sectors. With 250 m of omni transmission range,
each RA node can cover its own sector and the left and
right sectors. This means that 3 RA nodes are required to
form a robust DDMZ where RA nodes are selected from
disjoint sectors. This means that RA nodes cannot be selected
from the same sector or from two consecutive sectors. For
example, if a CA chooses node N3 then nodes from sectors
1, 2 or 3 cannot be selected. Thus, DDMZ can be formulated
by selecting nodes from sectors {1, 3, 5} or {2, 4, 6}. The
selection between both combination depends on the selection
criteria function F () given in subsection V-B. This formation
condition will increase the monitoring coverage area for the
cluster and thus the DDMZ is efficiently able to protect the
CA node from attacks originated from different directions.
The objective of maximizing the selection-criteria function (F)
of DDMZ can be expressed by the following Social Choice
Function (SCF):
SCF = S(C) = max
∑
i∈N
Fi (1)
This means that the summation of F given in Subsection V-B
of the selected RA nodes has to be maximum overall the set
of possible combination. Clearly, to maximize the summation,
the nodes need to reveal their truthful function F. In the next
subsection, we design a mechanism design based incentive
 
Fig. 1. Cluster of 10 nodes divided into 6 Sectors
model for encouraging each node in revealing its true function
value.
B. Selection Criteria Function (F )
The selection criteria function has the following parameters:
Trust Level/Metric (Z1): This metric determines the con-
fident level of nodes which is evaluated by the monitoring
mechanism. Each node has a reputation generated by the
monitoring mechanisms according to its contribution in the
network like forwarding ratio or others network’ services.
Stability Metric (Z2): RA node’s stability is based on the
relative mobility according to the CA node (it is the private
information of a node). The mobility metric is based on the
power level (received signal strength) detected at receiving
node RxPr, it is indicative of the distance between the trans-
mitting and receiving node pairs. The ratio of RxPr between
two successive packets transmissions gives a good knowledge
about the relative mobility between two neighboring nodes.
The relative mobility metric at node Y with respect to X is
defined by RMrely (x) [2].
RM relY (X) = 10 log10
RxPrnewX→Y
RxProldX→Y
(2)
Residual Energy Metric (Z3): This metric determines the
residual energy level of the nodes. This is also a private
information of a node.
Connectivity Degree (Z4): It is the number of links a node
is connected with. In other word, connectivity degree is the
number of one hop neighbors of a node. A node having
greater connect degree means that it can cover more nodes
for monitoring in the cluster.
Based on the above four parameters, our selection criteria
function F is defined as follows:
F =
4∑
i=1
WiZi (3)
where Wi is the weight of each parameter i. According to
the security context, the weight of the trust metric (W1) must
be greater than others metrics. However, the stability (W2)
and the residual energy (W3) have the same weight, because
both metrics have the same importance in the model. When
the stability metric is low, the RA node cannot be insured for
its role for long time. On the other hand, when the residual
energy metric is low, the RA will not be able to do its task
for long time. Finally, the connectivity degree metric (W4)
has the lowest weight since it does not impact the security of
the cluster. If the connectivity degree is low, then more RA
nodes are needed for coving the whole cluster. Therefore, we
can establish the relation between metrics’ weight as follows:
W1 > W2 = W3 > W4 and
∑4
i=1 Wi = 1.
The stability and residual energy are the private information,
which needs to be truthful in order to have a truthful calculated
function F . We give incentive in terms of reputation so that
nodes are motivated to participate and reveal their truthful
function F (). To achieve this goal, the payment should be
designed in such a way truth-telling is the dominant strategy
for each node.
C. Mechanism Model
We treat the RA election as a game where the N mobile
nodes are the agents/players. Each node plays by revealing its
own private information (selection criteria function (F )) which
is based on the node’s type θi. The type θi is drawn from each
player’s available type set Θi={Normal, Selfish}. Each player
selects his own strategy/type according to how much the node
values the outcome (i.e., The amount of reputation granted). If
the player’s strategy is normal then the node reveals the true
selection criteria function F . We assume that each player i
has a utility function [13]:
ui(θi) = pi − vi(θi, o(θi, θ−i)) (4)
where,
• θ−i is the type of all the other nodes except i.
• vi is the valuation of player i of the output o ∈ O,
knowing that O is the set of possible outcomes. In our
case, if the node is elected then vi is the value of the
selection criteria function Fi.
• pi ∈ ℜ is the payment given by the mechanism to the
elected node. Payment is given in the form of reputation.
Nodes that are not elected receive no payment.
Note that, ui(θi) is what the player usually seeks to maxi-
mize. It reflects the amount of benefits gained by player i if
he follows a specific type/strategy θi. Players might deviate
from revealing the truthful value of the function F if that
could lead to a better payoff. Therefore, our mechanism must
be strategy-proof where truth-telling is the dominant strategy.
To play the game, every node declares its corresponding
function F , where each node’s reported function value is the
input for our mechanism (i.e., input vector). For each input
vector, the mechanism calculates its corresponding output
o = o(θ1, . . . , θn) and a payment vector p = (p1, . . . , pn).
Payments are used to motivate players to behave in accordance
with the mechanism goals. The goal of our mechanism is to
motivate nodes to say the truth and compute the output o that
is equal to the SCF defined in Equation 1.
Payment Design: Based on the selection criteria function
revealed by all the nodes to the mechanism, CA elects a set
of nodes according to the requirement to play the role of RA
that forms the DDMZ. Our mechanism provides payments
to the elected RAs for running their monitor and forming a
DDMZ. The nodes that are not elected will not not receive
any payment. The payment is in the form of reputations,
which are then used to increase the trust level and allocate
the cluster’s services. Hence, any node will strive to increase
its reputation in order to increase the trust level.
According to VCG [1], the following design of payment is
strategy proof where truth-telling is the dominant strategy:
pi = Fi +
∑
i∈N
vi(o∗)−
∑
j∈N
vj(o∗) (5)
where o∗ is the optimal selection of nodes that maximizes
the sum of all the agent’s declared function value. Here,∑
j∈N vj(o∗) denotes the second maximum summation as-
suming without node i.
D. RA Election Algorithm
Once the CA node is determined by Algorithm 1, it
elects the RA nodes for the cluster. Initially, the CA sends
Start − Election message to each sector according to
Algorithm 2 using the directional antenna. Then, the CA
waits for the reply from the member nodes for a fixed
interval of time, T1. On expiration of T1, it sends the
Start − Election to the next sector. Thus, steps 2 and 3
are repeated for all the 6 sectors. At the end of T6, the
CA accumulates all the values of function F from the
member nodes. Then, it determines the RAs according to the
equation 1 and calculates the payment according to equation
5. Finally, CA sends a Payment − confirmation message
to the elected RAs.
Algorithm 2: Executed by CA node
1. For Sector 1 to 6:
2. Sends Start−Election message to its neighbors;
3. Wait for the reply from the member nodes;
4. End For
5. Determine the RA nodes for DDMZ;
6. Send Payment− confirmation to the RAs;
On the other hand, member nodes wait for the Start −
Election message from CA. Once received, it calculates
the function value, F and sends it to CA for optimal RA
determination. The member nodes then wait for the election
results from the CA. Elected RA nodes receive a Payment−
confirmation message from the CA and it launches its
monitor to perform the role of RA.
Algorithm 3: Executed by Member nodes
1. Receive Start− Election message from CA;
2. Calculate and Send the Function value F to CA node;
3. If node receive Payment− confirmation from CA;
4. Play the role of RA;
5. end If;
E. Example
To illustrate the RA election scheme, we consider the cluster
of Figure 1. Since our model is repeatable, we present the
election process at the 10th round. The reputation at the 9th
round is given in the first row of Table I.
TABLE I
DDMZ FORMATION EXAMPLE
Nodes N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N7 N8 N9
Reputation 9th 100 80 75 60 50 65 110 120 60
Function Value 3 5 9 8 7 6 6 5 3
Reputation 10th 100 80 84 72 58 65 110 120 60
To elect the RA nodes in the 10th round, the CA node sends
Start−Election message to all the sectors one after another.
Upon receiving the Start − Election message, the member
nodes send their function value, F to the CA node according
to Algorithm 2 and 3. The corresponding function values are
given in the second row of Table I. Then, the CA node elects
the RA nodes based on RA selection model (Section V-A).
Here, the winners (or elected RAs) are nodes N3, N4 and
N5 since the summation of their function value is maximum,
which is 20. Moreover, the CA calculates the payments of
the elected RAs according to equation 5. For example, the
payment for the node N3 is P3 = 5 + (20 − 16) = 9. This
is because if node N3 did not participate then the winners
would have been nodes N1, N2 and N6 and thus the maximum
summation would have been 16. Similarly, the payments for
the node N4 is P4 = 8 + (20 − 16) = 12 and N5 is P5 =
7 + (20 − 19) = 8. Finally, the CA sends a Payment −
confirmation message to the elected RA nodes and increases
the reputation of the nodes which is shown in the third row
of Table I. On receiving the confirmation, the elected nodes
launches the monitors to play to role of RA.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate and compare the performance of
the new proposed secure clustering algorithm (SDCAV 2) with
the previous model SDCAV 1 [18]. We have implemented
our clustering algorithm as described previously. We use the
Network Simulator (NS-2) [14] with CMU wireless extensions
to simulate our algorithm. Simulation scenarios were generated
with parameters listed in table II.
At first, we motivate our work showing the impact of selfish
nodes on the network. As mentioned before, nodes can behave
selfishly before the election. A node shows selfishness before
election by refusing to serve as RA. This selfishness has a
serious impact on resource consumption of the normal nodes.
Figure 2 depicts the impact of selfish nodes on the life of
normal nodes. The result indicates that normal nodes will carry
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value in our simulation
Number of nodes (N) 50
Network size (mxn) 670x670m2
Mobility [0-20 m/sec]
Transmission Range 50 m - 250 m
Pause time 3.0 s
Simulation time 200 s
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Fig. 2. Impact of selfish node on the lifetime of Network
out more the duty of RA and die faster whenever the number
of selfish nodes increase. Thus, the presence of selfish node
effect the lifetime of the entire network.
After we illustrated the impact of selfishness on the lifetime
of normal nodes, we need to show the performance of our
model on both: number of clusters and DDMZ formation. In
Figure 3.(a), we show the average number of CA nodes that
can create clusters. The figure shows that as the transmission
range increases the number of clusters decreases for both mod-
els. Due to the new cluster formation conditions, the number
of CA nodes of our model SDCAV 2 is greater than the
previous one SDCAV 1. In SDCAV 1, clusters are formulated
by at least two trusted nodes, where as in SDCAV 2, cluster
formation needs one trusted node. Hence, we can conclude
that the new model (SDCAV 2) is more flexible than the
previous one with respect to cluster’s formation. Thus, nodes’
CA service will be enhanced and probability of detecting
the misbehaving nodes can be increased since nodes will be
distributed over more number of CAs.
Now, we need to show that the selection criteria function
F and the directional antenna selection are needed to form a
robust DDMZ. First, we analyze the distribution of the RAs
in each cluster according to our proposed directional antenna
selection model. Our clustering algorithm divides 50 nodes
over 5 clusters when the transmission range is 250m. Figure
3.(b) illustrates the number of potential RA nodes in each
cluster’s sector. We notice that cluster 5 does not have enough
RAs to form a robust DDMZ. Selecting the nodes based on the
selection criteria can still be valid and nodes will be motivated
to reveal their function F but selected RA nodes cannot cover
the CA coverage area. On the other hand, the other clusters
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have sufficient RAs to form a robust DDMZ. As an example,
cluster 1 has RAs in all sectors. Thus, it can form a robust
DDMZ by selecting RAs from sectors 1, 3, 5.
Finally, we show how the value of function F () is used to
select RAs. Figure 3.(c) shows the maximum value reached
by the function F () in each clusters’ sector. This information
is useful for the CA in order to select the RA nodes since the
function F () determines the ability of the RA nodes to form
a robust DDMZ. We notice that in cluster 3, sector 3 has the
maximum value of F () among all the sectors. However, F ()
value is null in sectors 2 and 4. Hence, the CA will choose
RA from sector 1, 3, 5. Thus, the CA nodes select the RAs
not only based on the function F (), but also based on the
location (the sectors in which it belongs to) of the RA nodes
in order to form a robust DDMZ.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Dynamic Demilitarized Zone (DDMZ) is previously
proposed as a solution for protecting the CA node against
potential attacks. It is formed from one or more RA nodes
where the CA and RA nodes belong to the confident com-
munity. Clusters with one confident node, CA, cannot be
created and thus clusters sizes are increased which negatively
affect clusters services and stability. Moreover, clusters with
high density of RA can cause channel collision at the CA.
Additionally, clusters lifetime are reduced since RA monitors
are always launched and thus more resources are consumed.
Thus, we proposed a model based on mechanism design that
allow clusters with single trusted node (CA) to be created. The
mechanism is able to motivate nodes that does not belong
to the confident community to participate by giving them
incentives in the form of trust, which can be used for clusters
services. Moreover, a RA selection algorithm is proposed that
selects nodes based on a predefined selection criteria function
(F) and nodes location. This will lead to a robust DDMZ that
is able to preserve the security of CA and prolong the lifetime
of clusters. Simulation results indicate that our model lead to
more number of clusters and robust DDMZ can be created
based on both: selection criteria function F and directional
antenna selection model.
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